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Revived by the events of 11 September, the ticking bomb scenario and the underpinning 
attention to torture as a method of interrogation have become ubiquitous in public and 
academic debate. Beyond the debates, the ticking bomb scenario also continues to underpin 
policies of torture. It is frustrating that so much attention, and credibility, is given to this 
category of so-called ‘interrogational torture’. We remain far from understanding the practice. 
This chapter shows how the ticking bomb hypothetical inhibits understanding of the practice 
of torture and how it operates to neutralise the ideology of torture. The acceptance of the 
ticking bomb scenario as a legitimate point of debate, and as a legitimate basis of policy, 
simultaneously and paradoxically, facilitates the practice – torture is greeted as exceptional 
rather than understood as a continuous practice of violence. By exposing the ideology, it is 
possible to reveal the way in which the ticking bomb scenario serves as a more palatable proxy 
for the erasure of ‘political subjectivity’, and the creation of new political subjectivities, in the 
‘war on terror’, in the Empire and in the metropole. Torture is not about information and is 
not a method of interrogation. Torture is about the subjugation, pacification or correction of 
those constructed as not fully human, barbarians or sinners. The ticking bomb scenario, like 
the torture it encodes, is an instrument of the civilising mission. 
 
Introduction 
‘…all these prisoners who have been tied up and “interrogated”…’2 
 
Whilst there are numerous adaptations of the ticking bomb scenario,3 the construct generally 
refers to a hypothetical situation in which an individual has been detained and the authorities 
believe, or are certain, that the individual has the information to prevent an impending attack 
which will kill or injure many people. The individual is unwilling to disclose the information 
in interrogation. The authorities believe that the information can be obtained through torture. 
The hypothetical asks, in such a scenario, is it justifiable to torture the individual in order to 
save lives?4 
 
Revived by the events of 11 September, the ticking bomb scenario and the related question of 
torture as a method of interrogation have become ubiquitous in public and academic debate.5 
These debates should not be treated lightly. This discussion ought to give rise to considerable 
unease. My sense of unease is twofold. First, writing about this issue at all is unsettling. Why 
are we giving so much attention to the ticking bomb scenario whilst others are undertaking the 
 
1 I would like to thank Robert Knox, Thomas Beaumont, Kathleen Cavanaugh and Elvira Dominguez-Redondo 
for extremely useful, thoughtful and provocative comments on drafts of this chapter.  I also owe special thanks to 
the editors of this collection for their support. In particular, I would like to thank Malcolm Evans for extensive 
and productive comments as the work progressed. Errors are, of course, all mine. 
2 Aimé Césaire (Joan Pinkham trans), Discourse on Colonialism (Monthly Review Press, 2000) 35. 
3 For a collection of the various ticking bomb scenarios which have been proffered in the literature, see Yuval 
Ginbar, Why not torture terrorists? Moral, practical, and legal aspects of the ‘ticking bomb’ justification for 
torture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 379-386. 
4 Michelle Farrell, The Prohibition on Torture in Exceptional Circumstances (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
7. 
5 The geography of this debate is important. Sometimes described as a global debate, it is more accurate to describe 
it as quite geographically limited, particularly to the United States, and, to a lesser extent, to so-called Western 
countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and Israel. 
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urgent task of thinking about how to enforce the prohibition on torture, or of working to prevent 
torture, and to protect and treat victims? It is also a troubling prospect that engaging in this 
debate breathes life in to a topic that should be left to smoulder and smother in the ruins of the 
‘war on terror’.   
 
This uneasiness is accompanied by a background anxiety about the impossibility of foreclosing 
arguments, thereby preventing them from being exploited by those ready for a ‘debate’, or 
worse, by those who advocate for torture. Rodley, in this regard, recognised the pitfalls in 
defining torture very narrowly or prescriptively, thus, playing in to the hands of states and 
torturers eager to evade the ban. ‘It is obvious’, he argued, ‘that a juridical definition cannot 
depend upon a catalogue of horrific practices; for it to do so would simply provide a challenge 
to the ingenuity of the torturers, not a viable legal prohibition’.6 The euphemism of the Bush 
administration – ‘enhanced interrogation’ – and the ‘ingenuity’ of those who manipulated legal 
discussion of practices of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, gave very concrete 
expression to Rodley’s concern.7  
 
Shue provides an even more approximate expression of my own worry in the opening 
paragraph of his 1978 article Torture:  
 
Whatever one may have to say about torture, there appear to be moral reasons for not 
saying it. Obviously, I am not persuaded by these reasons but they deserve some mention. 
Mostly they add up to a sort of Pandora’s box objection. If practically everyone is 
opposed to all torture, why bring it up, start people thinking about it, and risk weakening 
the inhibitions against what is clearly a terrible business.8 
 
Shue was right to recognise that Pandora’s box was already open. In 2006, however, he 
redressed some of his own earlier arguments about interrogational torture in ‘rarefied 
situations’.9 He reaffirmed his position that ‘artificial cases make bad ethics’10 and emphasised 
that the ticking bomb scenario misleads through ‘idealisation and abstraction’.11 The timing of 
his 2006 article no doubt reflected the fact that abstract musings on torture had proved attractive 
(his own and the abundant writing of others); advocates were relying all too heavily on the 
ticking bomb scenario, and, in his case, ignoring his clear direction that the hypothetical 
‘assumed untenable circumstances and background conditions’.12 It also seems likely, though, 
that he must have lamented how the residual ambiguity of his own examination of 
interrogational torture – his sense of ‘the permissibility of torture in a [ticking bomb scenario] 
 
6 Nigel S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 1999) 
7 This is particularly the case as the Bush administration’s so-called ‘torture memos’, which gave birth to the 
enhanced interrogation programme, relied in part on an assessment which compared and contrasted its methods 
with the ‘five techniques’ that were central to the infamous 1978 European Court of Human Rights case of Ireland 
v United Kingdom. See, Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, ‘Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 1 August 2002, cited in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel 
(eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 172, 173, 196-198. 
Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 209-210; Michelle Farrell, ‘Transatlantic torture and the regrettable role of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ The Liverpool View (12 December 2014) available at https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2014/12/12/liverpool-
view-transatlantic-torture-regrettable-role-european-court-human-rights/.  
8 Henry Shue, Torture, (1978) Philosophy and Public Affairs 124. 
9 Ibid 143. 
10 Ibid 141. 
11 Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb (2006) 37 Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law 231. 
12 Farrell (n 4 above) 106. 
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just like this’ –13 has been interpreted and has fed in to debates since 1978.14 His two articles 
caution against discussing and debating torture in hypothetical scenarios as though those 
scenarios correlate with, or represent, the realities of the practice of torture.15  
 
Torture was then, and is now, practised widely. It continues to be concealed and denied; in 
some cases, it is justified publicly with reference to necessity, ticking bombs or an equivalent 
defence. Whatever the academic value of debate, legal, moral or philosophical rubberstamping 
is a questionable response to the practice of torture; the provision of legal, ethical or 
philosophical firepower to states who need no help hypocritically upholding their normative 
commitment to the ban whilst denying or justifying their practice of torture may indeed be 
moral reason not to say ‘whatever one may have to say about torture’.16 The lesson is to try to 
understand torture in practice, not to accept the justifications of states and perpetrators and not 
to engage in abstract hypothesising.  
 
It is frustrating that so much attention is given to the category of so-called ‘interrogational 
torture’ and to the hypothetical scenarios that underpin this category. We remain far from 
understanding torture. In recent years, the field has been conditioned by the appeal of 
Hollywood, the heroic, life-saving, remorseful, good guy who had no choice but to strong arm 
the bad guy.17 Beyond the screen, and the ivory tower, the histories of torture are piled up, 
packed with reality. As Wolcher so neatly put it, the ticking bomb scenario ‘threatens to lead 
us into a sort of bad infinity where we keep on overlooking instances of actual torture in order 
to take notice of the sort of ‘torture’ that only occurs inside works of fiction’.18  
 
The waning of the post 11 September torture debate stymied, though certainly did not stop,19 
the production of interventions on the ticking bomb scenario,20 facilitating, perhaps, a turn to a 
 
13 Shue (1978) (n 8 above) 141 
14 Shue (2006) (n 11 above) 231.  
15 Farrell (n 4 above) 24 citing Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2007) 547. 
16 See n 8 above. 
17 For a discussion of the representation of torture in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, see Derek Buescher, 
‘Exceptional Torture: Torture Imagery as Neocolonial Rhetoric’ in  Rae Lyn Schwartz-DuPré (ed), 
Communicating Colonialism: Readings on Postcolonial Theory(s) and Communications (Peter Lang, 2014) 128. 
18 Louis E. Wolcher, ‘Foreword’ in Farrell (n 4 above) xi. 
19 Proving the point that the ticking bomb torture debate is metastatic, the Human Rights Law Review has hosted 
a number of articles discussing the absolute nature of the prohibition against torture, precipitated by Greer’s 
reading of the European Court of Human Rights case of Gäfgen v Germany as demonstrating the ‘virtually’ 
absolute nature of the prohibition, except in the ‘rarest circumstances’. Steven Greer, ‘Should Police Threats to 
Torture Suspects Always be Severely Punished? Reflections on the Gäfgen Case’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law 
Review 67; Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really 
‘Absolute’ in International Human Rights Law?’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 101. These articles have 
generated thoughtful responses. In particular, Mavronicola rebuts the fictive idea that there is a rights conflict, 
manifested, as Greer attempts to argue, in cases such as Gäfgen, where, he argues, a kidnap victim’s rights should 
trump those of an unforthcoming suspect. Natasa Mavronicola, ‘Is the Prohibition against Torture and Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Absolute in International Human Rights Law: A Reply to Steven Greer’ 
(2017) 17 Human Rights Law Review 479. See also, Natasa Mavronicola, ‘Torture and Othering’ in Benjamin J 
Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds.), Security and Human Rights (2nd ed. Hart Publishing, 2019) 27, 31 where she 
shows that Greer has ‘miscast the issue and glossed over important aspects’ in confusing the legal reality of rights 
in conflict. See also, Neil Graffin, ‘Gäfgen v Germany, the Use of Threats and the Punishment of those who Ill-
treat during Police Interrogation: A Reply to Steven Greer’ (2017) 17 Human Rights Law Review 681. 
20 It is difficult to gauge how the shift away from this particular debate impacts the practice of torture. The practice, 
to be clear, continues. It is certainly true, though, that the US practice and justification of torture and ill-treatment, 
as well as the ticking bomb rationale, have been used to licence or legitimate torture around the world. See 
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur, Manfred Novak’ A/HRC/13/39/Add. 5, para. 44. It may also be the 
case that the turn of public attention away from torture impacts the scrutiny of extensive ongoing practices. 
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different kind of sustained and enlightening scholarly engagement with the study of torture.21 
There are reasons to be cautious though in assessing the Bush administration era of torture. The 
‘war on terror ‘did not end, the truly responsible in the Bush administration have faced little 
sanction,22 and the torture debate was never really ‘won’ or put to bed. The Findings and 
Conclusions and Executive Summary of the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture 
made an enormous splash when first published.23 The product of around five years of work and 
of the analysis of ‘more than six million pages of CIA materials’, the declassified executive 
summary determined, amongst other damning findings:  
 
#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means 
of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees;  
#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on 
inaccurate claims of their effectiveness;  
#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA 
represented to policymakers and others.24  
 
There has, however, been no real effort to prosecute those most responsible within the CIA for 
executing and delivering the enhanced interrogation programme or to seek out any mechanism 
of accountability.25 Whilst criminal accountability was never really the objective of the Senate 
Select Intelligence Committee in pursuing its inquiry and in preparing the report, nothing 
significant has, to date, resulted from its publication.26 The focus of the Committee on the CIA 
also allowed those responsible within the Bush administration to fly below the radar. Obama, 
who fought his first campaign on a decisively anti-torture stance, left office having never let 
go of his compulsion to move forward rather than spending time ‘laying blame for the past’.27 
Moreover, the report’s findings and the underpinning inquiry were, at any rate, deemed 
partisan, an exercise in cherry-picking.28 Trump then entered office having fought a campaign 
promising to waterboard and worse,29 fully convinced, despite everything, in his own ‘feelings’ 
 
21 There are already a few examples. For an excellent study of the collaboration between France and Argentina 
through French military ‘assistance’ in training torturers, see Melanie Collard, Torture as State Crime: A 
Criminological Analysis of the Transnational Institutional Torturer (Routledge, 2018). For an important study of 
the effectiveness of torture prevention, see Richard Carver and Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? 
(Liverpool University Press, 2016).  
22 For an account of the construction of the legal advice that led to the use of torture in interrogation and for a 
discussion of the responsibility of the lawyers, see Phillipe Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the 
Compromise of Law (Allen Lane, 2008). 
23 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee 
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’  (Melville House, Brooklyn, 
London, 2014).  
24 Ibid 5. 
25 Stephen I. Vladeck, ‘The Torture Report and the Accountability Gap’ (2015) Summer/Fall Georgetown Journal 
of International Affairs 174.  
26 It could be argued that the appointment of Gina Haspel as CIA Director actually shows that the opposite is the 
case. See, Adam Serwer, ‘Obama’s legacy of impunity for torture’ The Atlantic (14 March 2018) 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/obamas-legacy-of-impunity-for-torture/555578/; Lisa 
Hajjar, ‘Why Gina Haspel, the Queen of Torture, was able to rise to the top of the CIA’ The Nation (16 March 
2018) available at https://www.thenation.com/article/why-gina-haspel-the-queen-of-torture-was-able-to-rise-to-
the-top-of-the-cia/.  
27 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Statement of Barack Obama on Release of OLC Memos’ 16 
April 2009. 
28 Mark Pythian, ‘An INS Special Forum: The US Senate Select Committee Report on the CIA’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program’ (2016) 31 Intelligence and National Security 8, 9. 
29 Mavronicola, ‘Torture and Othering’ (n 9 above) 32-33. 
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on the matter: ‘absolutely, I feel it works’.30 His defence of torture sounded particularly 
preposterous. But the only real difference between Trump and his torture defending 
predecessors was in his more frank choice of words. Bush and his administration used 
euphemisms for torture and were less likely to parse their convictions in the indeterminacy of 
feelings: enhanced interrogation methods work…are necessary…have thwarted attacks or led 
to finding Osama Bin Laden…do not constitute torture; these were, and still are for many, the 
assertions of the Bush administration and CIA torture programme architects.31 As O’ Mara so 
aptly remarks, however, on this conviction around efficacy or necessity, Bush administration 
‘policy seems to have been based on some combination of political preference and intuitive 
belief about human nature’.32 The mask slipped with Trump.  
 
The ticking bomb scenario has, in all that time, been popularised and debated, in classrooms, 
newspapers and newsrooms, in tv shows and films and across the academy. It lies around like 
a torture device.33 Moreover, the ticking bomb scenario continues to underpin, with Supreme 
Court approval, the policy of ‘special interrogation methods’ against Palestinians in Israel.34  
 
Despite the unease and the despair with this infatuation with the ticking bomb scenario, there 
is value in examining why the idea of torture as a method of interrogation is so prevalent and 
in understanding how and why so many have been so seduced by the ticking bomb scenario. 
The hypothetical also has some value when treated – merely – as the site from which to pursue 
an archaeology of torture – sifting through rhetoric, ideology and histories of torture can help 
us to understand the contemporary practice of torture.  
 
This chapter shows how the ticking bomb hypothetical inhibits understanding of the practice 
of torture and how it operates to neutralise the ideology of torture. The acceptance of the ticking 
bomb discourse as a legitimate starting point, simultaneously and paradoxically, facilitates the 
practice – torture is greeted as exceptional rather than understood as a continuous practice of 
violence. By exposing the ideology, this chapter reveals the way in which the ticking bomb 
scenario serves as a proxy for domination and control, that is, for the erasure of ‘political 
subjectivity’,35 and the creation of new political subjectivities, whether in ‘war on terror’, the 
Empire or in the metropole. Torture, I argue, is not about information and is not a method of 
interrogation. Torture is about the subjugation, pacification or correction of those constructed 
as not fully human, barbarians or sinners.  
 
In this chapter, I will, first, critique how we talk about torture. I will argue that many of the 
most common ways in which torture and the ticking bomb scenario are discussed reinforce an 
ideology of torture. The discussion of torture’s efficacy, efforts to question the plausibility of 
 
30 Matthew Weaver and Spencer Ackerman, ‘Trump claims torture works but experts warn of its “potentially 
existential” costs’ The Guardian (26 January 2017) interview and analysis available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/26/donald-trump-torture-absolutely-works-says-us-president-
in-first-television-interview.  
31 See, for example, John Rizzo, Company Man (Scribe, 2014) 186, 233, 297-302; Jose A Rodriguez, Hard 
Measures: How Aggressive C.I.A Actions after 9/11 Saved American Lives (Threshold Editions, 2012) 66, 69; 
Donald Rumsfeld xii, 570-572, 582, 601-609.   
32 Shane O’ Mara, Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation (Harvard University Press, 
2015) 12. 
33 Wolcher (n 18 above) x. 
34 Smadar Ben-Natan, ‘Revise your Syllabi: Israeli Supreme Court Upholds Authorisation for Torture and Ill-
Treatment (2019) 10 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 41. 
35 Marita Sturken, ‘Comfort, irony and trivialisation: The mediation of torture’ (2011) 14 International Journal of 
Cultural Studies 423, 424. 
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the ticking bomb scenario and examinations, through ethical argument, of torture in the ticking 
bomb scenario should all be treated with caution as these approaches inadvertently advance the 
ideology. Unpacking these overtures to the ticking bomb scenario is essential, first, for 
uncovering the ideology and, second, for reaching an understanding of torture as a civilising 
process. 
 
Secondly, I critique the approach of categorising torture as interrogational. The tendency to 
discuss torture according to its purported purpose of obtaining information in interrogation 
manufactures an understanding of torture at serious odds with reality or history. This 
understanding of torture is, perhaps, inevitable, reified as it is by the definition of torture under 
international law where ‘torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes … as obtaining … 
information’.36 Whilst a prohibited purpose, this definition reinforces the idea that torture has 
such a purpose, that torture is a method of interrogation. Torture is not a ‘method of 
interrogation’; its aim is to destroy subjectivity. The words ‘purpose’ and ‘method’, however, 
condition a comprehension of torture as a means to an end (though most accept it to be a 
morally and legally prohibited means). That interrogation is merely the context for a form of 
violence, which aims at destroying subjectivity, is hard to grasp in the face of such rationalising 
language, law and learned intuition. Separating torture from interrogation in this way is a 
further essential step in reaching an understanding of torture as a civilising process. 
 
Finally, I will show that the ticking bomb scenario is an imperial concept which remains, today, 
an instrument of the civilising mission. The ticking bomb scenario emerged out of a colonial 
context - expressly Algeria, although, equivalent constructions were used elsewhere.37 It was a 
rationale that solved the equation between ‘their’ use of terrorism and ‘our’ use of torture (of 
course, the word torture is always avoided). The priority of thwarting terrorism provided a 
more palatable substitute to the reality of torture as an exercise of power to subdue the ‘savage’ 
for the preservation, and extension, of ‘our’ values, ‘our’ civilisation.38 The ticking bomb 
scenario is the conceptual or political mechanism by which the colonised, the terrorist, or the 
deviant, more generally, can be excluded from the universal prohibition on torture.39  
 
1. Debating Torture 
 
There are important points of departure to avoid – or, at a minimum, to take great care with – 
in the discussion of torture and the ticking bomb scenario.40 These points of departure are: first, 
 
36 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 
10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987),1465 UNTS 85, 113 , Art 1(1) (emphasis added). 
37 The British government justified their brutality and the so-called five techniques in Northern Ireland on the 
grounds of saving the lives of civilians and members of the security forces: ‘information must be sought while it 
is still fresh so that it may be used as quickly as possible to effect the capture of persons, arms and explosives, 
and thereby save the lives of members of the security forces and of the civil population’. See, Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, ‘Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in 
Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August, 1971’ (1971). In Kenya, where the British were 
responsible for widespread and systematic torture in the context of the Mau Mau rebellion, they used 
‘euphemisms, technical jargon, and a sanitized vocabulary of abuse’. See Yolana Pringle, ‘Humanitarianism, Race 
and Denial: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Kenya’s Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952-60’ (2017) 84 
History Workshop Journal 89, 97. 
38 See generally Rita Maran, Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French Algerian War (Praeger, 1989). For a 
concrete discussion of this point, see pages 81-84 and 95-97 in particular. 
39 Anthony Anghie, ‘The War on Terror and Iraq in Historical Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
44, 52. 
40 Farrell (n 4 above) 14-17. 
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the question of torture’s efficacy, second, the plausibility of the ticking bomb hypothetical, 
and, third, taking part in the debate by promoting a moral or ethical normative perspective in 
response to the ticking bomb scenario. Even the most rigorous and well-intentioned discussant 
seems unable to avoid the traps of this ‘torture in the ticking bomb scenario’ debate and, though 
they may not notice it or admit, they may find themselves reinforcing the torturer’s justificatory 
perspective. These points of departure snare commentators in an escapist, circuitous, 
subservient debate that is entirely detached from the lived reality of torture. By examining how 
commentators have engaged in this debate, I illuminate just how this ticking bomb debate is 
rigged. 
 
a. The efficacy debate 
 
The efficacy of torture is a treacherous point of departure. The most watertight study will still 
be met with the incredulous, ‘but what about x’, or the dogged refrain, ‘it might work in y’. As 
such, the debate is intractable. It also concedes too much. If torture is proved always 
inefficacious, then we can stop debating efficacy and concentrate on why it is practised, and 
we can criticise states for torturing ‘superfluously’. The dark side of the coin, however, is in 
the submission, however unintentionally, first, to the idea that efficacy matters – that torture, 
argued to be efficacious, is up for debate, and, second, to the suggestion that states would not 
practise torture if they understood its inefficacy. 
 
There may be exceptions in the literature to the otherwise seemingly unavoidable problem of 
reifying the efficacy of torture through debate. In Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The 
Neuroscience of Interrogation, O’ Mara provides a rigorous, meticulous and persuasive 
evidence-based argument demonstrating the inefficacy of torture. He also undertakes his study 
with integrity, grounding the examination in an attentive rebuttal of any case for the use of 
torture, whatever the science. His discussion of how the Bush administration torture policy 
architects ‘consulted their consciousness’ in defining and authorising torture and of their bad 
faith in picking and choosing the law and the science is scathing and grounds his thesis in an 
informed political context.   
 
His central argument holds that torture has the completely contrary effect to the torturer’s 
claim, to the folk- or common-sense myth and to that which is portrayed in fiction. Torture, ‘a  
profound and extreme stressor that causes widespread and enduring alterations to the very 
fabric of the brain’, inhibits memory.41 The stress and pain of torture – techniques such as those 
used by the Bush administration, including, sleep deprivation, drowning, environment and diet 
manipulation and physical violence – suppress cognitive ability: ‘…when one is experiencing 
threat, especially predator threat, which profoundly threatens ones bodily integrity and which 
is associated with pain, conscious regions are to a very large extent overridden’.42 O’ Mara 
makes a plea for scientific, empirically grounded examination of the efficacy question, 
although he is wholly aware that the myth of efficacy is deeply embedded, intuitively and 
socially.  
 
For many, the practice of torture is evidence of efficacy. Levinson maintained, at one point: 
‘If, after all, there were no genuine lure of the sirens, Ulysses would scarcely have needed to 
 
41 O’ Mara (n 32 above) 8. 
42 Ibid 144. As well as this more general examination of the effect of stress and pain on the brain, O’ Mara 
examines in detail the specific effects on the brain of sleep deprivation and of drowning, cooling, heating and 
starving the brain. 
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tie himself to the mast’.43 In other words, the prohibition is needed because the practice exists 
and that practice shows torture’s efficacy. As such, and because he explains and then destroys 
this kind of (il)logic – those ‘insights’ that are rooted in common-sense simplicity – O’ Mara’s 
book is an inestimable contribution.  
 
O’ Mara’s argument and conclusions are, however, not without issue. Despite apprehending 
the political context, O’ Mara leaves the, perhaps inadvertent, impression that a science or 
evidence-based understanding might prevent torture or have prevented the Bush policy, or that 
this evidence basis disproving efficacy could abolish the practice of torture. There are two 
important issues here. First, evidence matters, he says; in so doing, however, he also suggests 
that efficacy matters. It is not far-fetched to claim that a state, the US for example, acting in 
bad faith, wishing to torture, will find alternative evidence, a scientific study that wields to 
their needs. Indeed, the CIA has done it before.44 Evidence is not infallible. Second, though, 
and more importantly, O’ Mara takes the torturing state or the torturer at their word. The 
attention given to this purported purpose of extracting information maintains the 
transubstantiation of justification into fact or truth (albeit a fact/truth he sets out to disprove).  
By examining the use of torture for information – obtaining information being the only 
rationale or justification that contemporary states tend to provide when forced – O’ Mara 
assumes that perpetrators torture in a mistaken belief in the reliability of torture. He gives too 
much credibility to, what Luban described fittingly as, the ‘liberal ideology of torture’: 
 
The liberal ideology insists that the sole purpose of torture must be intelligence gathering 
to prevent the catastrophe; that torturing is the exception, not the rule so that it has 
nothing to do with state tyranny; that those who inflict the torture are motivated solely 
by the looming catastrophe, with no tincture of cruelty…’ 45  
 
In order to really get to grips with torture, its history in various contexts and its future, it is, of 
course, important to destabilise the folk myth about efficacy and obtaining information because 
the ignorance can nourish the political context or environment in which torture is practised and 
feed the impunity of the perpetrators. But it is more important to redirect focus completely to 
why states practise torture. In order to understand why, it is essential to come to terms with the 
reality that claims about obtaining urgent information may disguise an individual’s underlying 
motivations but, more importantly, such claims certainly conceal the underlying policy 
context,46 and, crucially, ideology. Simply put, we cannot take states at their word; a deeply 
deconstructive, sceptical approach is warranted. 
 
The treacherous question – ‘does torture work?’ – is a good starting point for a healthy dose of 
scepticism.  It is rare for either the questioner or the respondent to define what they mean by 
‘works’ and just as rare to see the question itself placed under scrutiny. There is merit in doing 
so. Agency - the perpetrator and the victim – is neutralised in the question – torture is doing 
 
43 Sanford Levinson, ‘”Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 
11’ Texas Law Review (2003) 81 2013, 2030. 
44 Henry Shue. ‘Book Review: Why Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation: By Shane O’ 
Mara’ (2016) 37 Political Psychology 753, 756. See, in particular on this point, Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine 
(Penguin 2007) 25-46, describing CIA funding, and manipulation, of psychological research carried out at McGill 
University in the 50s. See also, generally, Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, From the 
Cold War to the War on Terror (Metropolitan Books,76 2006); Jennifer Harbury, Truth, Torture and the American 
Way: The History and Consequences of US Involvement in Torture (Beacon Press, 2005).  
45 David Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1425, 1439.  
46 Herbert C. Kelman, ‘The Policy Context of Torture: A Social-Psychological Analysis’ (2005) 87 International 
Review of the Red Cross 123. 
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the torturing and the ‘working’. This is pure abstraction. But, more importantly, what is meant 
by the verb ‘work’ is generally left to the imagination. In Algeria, torture was geared at 
liquidating the leadership of the National Liberation Front (Fronte de libération nationale or 
FLN) and breaking the organisation completely.47 Torture ‘worked’ because, by arresting and 
torturing thousands of people (many to death), the French shattered the resistance, terrorised 
and repressed the population - they broke their enemy.48  
 
Central to the question – does torture work – is, of course, the assumptions that the torture is 
‘interrogational’ and applied for a worthy, or good, purpose as well as the presupposition of 
identification with whoever is doing the torturing. In this framing, intimidation and dominance 
over the suspect or victim are by-products of the urgency of obtaining the information, not 
central features of torture. The question is loaded and circuitous, and, it seems, it is perfect 
fodder for the fearful, the retributive, and the opinionated, roused by anecdote.49 
 
b. The plausibility of the ticking bomb scenario  
 
As torture became a matter of public debate in the years following the attacks of 11 September, 
it became common for commentators to rest their arguments against the use of torture on the 
implausibility of that scenario ever materialising.  
 
For example, in its guidance on the appropriate response to the ticking bomb scenario, the 
Swiss-based non-profit Association for the Prevention of Torture attempted to formulate a 
scheme for discrediting the scenario whilst reiterating the legal and ethical value of the torture 
prohibition.50 The detailed response to the scenario, as the report explains, exposes the hidden 
assumptions of the ticking bomb scenario and debunks those assumptions. For the APT, the 
problematic assumptions included supposed certainty about: the existence of the attack and its 
imminence; having the right person in custody, with the information, only available through 
torture; and the existence of a torturer motivated only by stopping the attack, and only in this 
particular case.51 The report also warned of the risk of the descent down the slippery slope – 
allowing for torture in the exceptional case would open the floodgates to widespread and 
systematic torture.52 The APT aimed to equip the public, human rights advocates, academics 
and government officials with central arguments to rebut the ticking bomb exception to the 
prohibition. Their task, as for others in this debate, was Sisyphean. The ticking bomb 
hypothetical aims to elicit one’s intuition about the use of torture in an exceptional 
circumstance; in so doing, it constructs, or reinforces, a particular account or understanding of 
 
47 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford University Press, 2012) 206. 
48 By the end of the Battle of Algiers, 24,000 individuals had been arrested: most were tortured - 80% of the men 
+ 66% of the women; 3,024 were disappeared, following summary execution or death in interrogation. Raphaëlle 
Branche, La torture et l’armée pendant la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), cited in Rejali, Torture and 
Democracy (n 15 above) 482. See also, generally, Raphaëlle Branche, ‘Torture of Terrorists? Use of Torture in a 
“War Against Terrorism”: Justification, Methods and Effects: the Case of France in Algeria, 1954–1962’ (2007) 
89 International Review of the Red Cross 543.  
49 O’ Mara (n 32 above) 2-3. O’ Mara makes a couple of neat assertions that have inspired my point here. He 
remarks, ‘…the protorture and procoercian case is almost always made with an ad hoc mixture of anecdote, 
cherry-picked stories, and entirely counterfactual stories that the authors usually find convincing – like the ticking 
bomb scenario’. He also says, correctly, ‘…it also seems to me, having read many of these protorture cases, that 
at least some authors are motivated by a barely uttered desire to engage in torture…for retributive or punitive 
reasons’.  
50 Association for the Prevention of Torture, ‘Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: Why We Must Say No To 
Torture, Always’ (Geneva: Association for the Prevention of Torture, 2007). 
51 Ibid 4-11. 
52 Ibid 13-14. 
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torture. Rebutting the hypothetical without challenging this learned and constructed 
understanding of torture misses the very deception of the hypothetical – the hypothetical 
renders reality in a way that edits out apprehension or understanding of torture.53 
 
In his 2006 essay, Shue argued that imaginary examples like the ticking bomb hypothetical are 
misleading because they both idealise and abstract: ‘Idealisation adds sparkle, abstraction 
removes dirt.’54 So, for Shue, the ticking bomb scenario idealises by adding positive features 
that make them more concrete than is likely under real circumstances: ‘The right man’ is in 
custody and he will promptly and accurately disclose information under torture. And torture 
will only be used in this ‘rare, isolated case’.55 The ticking bomb scenario abstracts from reality 
by removing negative features: the hypothetical erases the reality that torture requires 
institutional competence – proper administration, thus, trained torturers.56 We know, though, 
that Shue is unable to disregard fully catastrophic logic, and, as such, he winds up reproducing 
the state’s excuse: ‘If the perfect time for torture comes, and we are not prepared to prevent a 
terroristic catastrophe, we will at least know that we have not sold our souls and we have not 
brutalized the civilization.’57  
 
According to Brecher, ‘to use a hypothetical example as though it were a real case without first 
considering very carefully its plausibility in the real world is intellectually and politically 
irresponsible’.58 Brecher echoes Scheppele who dismissed the hypothetical as “irresponsible” 
because of its presentation of the ‘purity of the extreme’.59 Like Scheppele, Brecher set about 
undermining the scenario with the goal of showing it to be a fantasy and, thus, no basis for 
public policy. Brecher focused his attention on the problems with the internal logic of the 
scenario by querying assumptions around capacity to torture, its effectiveness, within the 
necessary time, perpetrated on the person who knows, in a situation of necessity. Like so many 
others, Brecher is also wary of the ‘slippery slope’, allowing torture in the ticking bomb 
scenario would ‘lead to its spread’, ‘normalizing the practice’.60 Brecher is not just concerned 
with the ticking bomb scenario. He goes deeper to recognise that ‘interrogational torture’ itself 
– that is, torture as a method applied to obtain information in interrogation - is a fantasy and 
that torture is inherently wrong. Brecher is particularly self-conscious, attentive to the 
intellectual poverty of the approach that he has had to take by engaging in such an engrossed 
deconstruction of ticking bomb logic: ‘My excuse…and I hope a justification, is that I had to 
get my hands intellectually dirty if I was to offer arguments that stood a chance of being listened 
to’, he remarks.61 Brecher, like O’ Mara, is persuasive but the examination has limits. He closes 
off so many of the arguments of the apologists and demonstrates the moral bankruptcy at the 
heart of the ticking bomb debate. However, he is unable to fully avoid the traps of the scenario 
and, like Shue, he reproduces the logic of the state – that the use of torture could avoid the 
 
53 Farrell (n 4 above) 25; Mathias Thaler, Naming Violence: A Critical Theory of Genocide, Torture, and 
Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2018) 105. 
54 Shue (2006) (n 11 above) 231. 
55 Ibid 233. 
56 Ibid 237. 
57 Ibid 239. 
58 Bob Brecher, Torture and the Ticking Bomb (Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 9. 
59 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Hypothetical Torture in the War on Terrorism’ (2005) 1 Journal of National Security 
Law and Policy 285. Scheppele mounts a sociological attack on the gap between the hypothetical and real-life 
and cautions against consequentialist analyses of the ticking bomb scenario. 
60 Brecher (n 58 above) 75. 
61 Ibid 88. 
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catastrophe: ‘The very occasional catastrophe’, he writes, ‘is the price we have to pay to avoid 
creating a torturous society’.62  
 
Debating the plausibility of the materialisation of a ticking bomb scenario, in these ways, is – 
like efficacy – treacherous. Arguments advocating a moral standpoint do not stand a chance in 
a debate characterised by moral contestation, submerged in ideology. Implausibility arguments, 
moreover, are a gift to those imaginative or ill-intentioned enough to mould what they think is 
the ever more conceivable or realisable scenario. To those who are primed to think with the 
ticking bomb, ticking bombs become omnipresent – kidnapping cases, hostage scenarios all 
earn ticking bomb logic. 
 
Some commentators have recognised, and taken seriously, the treachery of the ticking bomb 
scenario.63 For Luban, the ticking bomb ‘cheats its way around … [the] difficulties by 
stipulating that the bomb is there, ticking away, and that officials know it and know they have 
the man who planted it’.64 These exact circumstances will, he argues, seldom be met. Whilst 
even opening this ‘seldom’ space risks concession, Luban’s uneasiness with the ticking bomb 
scenario goes, at any rate, far beyond it having these obvious deceptions and impracticalities. 
Luban dismisses the ticking bomb scenario as intellectual fraud and because he views it as 
signposting a liberal ideology of torture whilst ignoring the actual practice of torture:65 ‘any 
responsible discussion of torture must address the practice of torture, not the ticking-bomb 
hypothetical’, he maintains.66 It is on Bush administration policy and practices, and not the 
ticking bomb scenario, that his analysis concludes. It is crucial to resist engaging in the ticking 
bomb discussion because, as I will now show, the ticking bomb scenario operates to neutralise 
an ideology of torture. 
 
i. Shaping reality: the ticking bomb as ideology  
 
First, approaching the hypothetical as mere fantasy, or as a thought-experiment that can be 
dismantled conclusively, leaves the impression that the root of this discussion or issue is 
practical – but those exact circumstances could never happen in that way! - rather than 
ideological. The ticking bomb scenario and the understanding of torture it creates is an 
ideological construct precisely because it is a concept which shapes reality – that is, which 
shapes a reality of torture.  
 
The meaning of ideology is not easily rendered. It has a complex history,67 and multiple 
meanings,68 but the concept is constructive. In general terms, and in Freeden’s words, ideology 
can be understood as a ‘specific way of interpreting and decoding political reality, to construing 
political practices as expressions of, and constitutive of, political ideas, with the ultimate goal 
 
62 Ibid 88. 
63 See, for example, Elaine Scarry, ‘Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz’ in Sanford Levinson 
(ed.), Torture: A Collection ( Oxford University Press, 2004) 281. Understandably, like Brecher, Scarry did find 
it necessary to counteract the arguments advocating torture in ticking bomb situations because they had become 
so common not just in academic writing but also in policy-making. 
64 Luban (n 45 above) 1442. 
65 Ibid 1439. Farrell (n 4 above) 130. 
66 Luban (n 45 above)1445. 
67 John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication 
(Polity Press, 1990) 29. 
68 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (Verso, 1991, 2007 edn) 1-2. 
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of formulating a legitimated public policy’.69 Freeden’s account of ideology implies neither a 
negative or positive reading. It is, for him, an important way of understanding the political 
tradition at work.70 But even this quite neutral definition of ideology can help to understand 
how the act of torture, often spoken of as beyond the Pale, as medieval, as dictatorial or 
tyrannical, indeed, as evil, can, using the ideological construct of the ticking bomb scenario, 
be translated in to, or construed as, something necessary, acceptable and legitimate, and, thus, 
made policy.  
 
A more critical or analytical examination of the ideology of the ticking bomb scenario is 
revealing of the myriad ways in which this ideology is sustained through its discussion and 
deconstruction as well as through its deployment in a policy context. To sharpen the 
examination, a critical, penetrative understanding of ideology is needed. Thompson, informed 
primarily by Marx’ use of the term, says, ‘to study ideology is to study the ways in which 
meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination’.71 Marks, drawing on 
Thompson, understands ideology as ‘the mystifications through which ideas help to establish 
and maintain’ domination in asymmetrical power relations.72 Marks isolates insightfully the 
distinction between being ideological and perpetuating ideology through one’s actions, 
however unintentionally. This insight is crucial in helping to explain how the ticking bomb 
discussion is handled, by voices on all sides and why this discussion is part of the problem. She 
remarks:  
 
…the mystification lies not in unawareness of social reality, but in unawareness of, or at 
any rate inattention to, the extent to which actions and words, and the ideas expressed 
through them, serve to shape social reality…the mystification lies in a failure adequately 
to consider the reflexivity of social life---the way social practices are continually re-
examined and reformed in the light of what is said about them.73 
 
The ideology at stake in the ticking bomb debate starts to crystallise under this observation. 
Ideology is not only (or even importantly) about what you or I, Shue or Brecher think of the 
practice of torture or of the ticking bomb scenario. The ideology is contained within the 
scenario itself and in the conception of torture that it provokes. It is no good being against 
torture, even in the catastrophic case, or being sceptical of the catastrophic case itself, whilst 
engaging it, arguing its merits, pros and cons, because this engagement and argument 
perpetuates an ideology of torture. Eagleton provides the elegant framework for this 
understanding. He says:   
 
Ideology…[is] not just a matter of what I think about a situation. It is somehow inscribed 
in the situation itself. It is no good my reminding myself that I am opposed to racism as 
I sit down on a park bench marked ‘Whites Only’: by the action of sitting on it, I have 
supported and perpetuated racist ideology. The ideology, so to speak, is in the bench, not 
in my head.74 
 
 
69 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford University Press, 1996) 
553. 
70 Susan Marks, ‘Big Brother is Bleeping Us – With the Message that Ideology Doesn’t Matter’ (2001) 12 
European Journal of International Law 109, 111. 
71 Thompson (n 67 above) 56. 
72 Marks (n 70 above) 109 and 111. 
73 Ibid 113 (emphasis added). 
74 Ibid citing Eagleton (n  68 above) 40. 
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It is not easy to explain the practice of torture. However, by investigating and exposing the 
ideological architecture of the ticking bomb construct, it is possible to reach an authoritative 
comprehension of torture on terms that simultaneously eschew and explain those that have 
been set by the state. In this respect, Luban and Rejali are very useful to my excavation of the 
ideology of the ticking bomb scenario and to my illumination of the ticking bomb scenario as 
imperial ideology.  
 
Luban examines torture’s complicated relationship with liberalism as embodied in the ticking 
bomb scenario. He views the ticking bomb scenario as rhetorically valuable, first, as a 
mechanism to unravel the prohibitionist’s absolute moral stance against torture: ‘Dialectically, 
getting the prohibitionist to address the ticking bomb is like getting the vegetarian to eat just 
one little oyster because it has no nervous system. Once she does that – gotcha!’75 He disregards 
this kind of utilitarian or cost-benefit approach as a way of thinking about torture.76 Second, he 
views it as a mechanism for placating liberal aversion to cruelty by portraying the torturer ‘in 
a different light’: ‘The torturer is…a conscientious public servant, heroic…, willing to do 
desperate things only because the plight is so desperate and so many innocent lives are 
weighing on the public servant's conscience. The time bomb clinches the great divorce between 
torture and cruelty’.77 The ticking bomb scenario, for Luban, is principally a way of making a 
barbarous practice liberally palatable. Luban is reluctant to get in the mechanics of the ticking 
bomb scenarios.  
 
Rejali opens up the space to consider the complex gender norms that underpin torture and the 
ticking bomb scenario. Drawing particularly on the Algerian context, on Fanon, Sartre, and 
Lartéguy’s novel Les Centurions, he situates the ticking bomb scenario within the context of 
hegemonic gender norms,78 fears of fading masculinity, and of democracy corrupting 
masculinity. ‘Torture generates a kind of manly strength’ for those who ‘worry that we have 
become sissies and our enemies know it’.79 The ticking bomb scenario, he observes, provokes 
‘a long-felt, common anxiety that democracy has made us weak and there are no real men 
anymore’.80 Torture is employed then in defence of civilisation, a civilisation that, to defeat its 
enemies, must ‘man-up’. His analysis augments an understanding of torture that is otherwise 
stunted by the ticking bomb framing. His point is not to simplify or caricature torture 
perpetrators as male (though the ticking bomb hypothetical does invite a gendered reading). 
Rather, Rejali found that ‘manhood and democracy’ were ‘very much at issue in discussions 
of torture during the Algerian War’, where ticking bomb logic was pervasive, and he finds 
these same discussions underpinning the rise of the ticking bomb and the use of torture in the 
post 11 September United States context. Rejali taps in to important gendered configurations 
which structure social practice and, as such, his work invites a deeper reading of torture.   
 
The state is a masculine institution.81 The US military is ‘a masculinist and heterosexist 
environment’.82 Crucially, in this setting, gender and race interlock: the reclamation or defence 
of masculinity, observable in the aftermath of 11 September, meshed with ‘white fears’ of the 
 
75 Luban (n 45 above) 1427. 
76 David Luban and MJ Engel, ‘Intersections of Torture and Power: An Interview with David Luban’ (2014) 15 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 110.  
77 Luban (n 45 above)1441. 
78 In particular, Rejali highlights ‘hegemonic masculinity’ whereby a particular masculinity dominates. See R. W. 
Connell, Masculinities (2nd ed. Polity, 2005) 77. 
79 Darius Rejali, ‘Torture makes the man’ (2007) 24 South Central Review 151, 151 and 169. 
80 Rejali, Torture and Democracy (n 15 above) 548. 
81 R. W. Connell, Masculinities (2nd ed. Polity, 2005) 75. 
82 Ryan Ashley Caldwell, Fallgirls: Gender and the Framing of Torture at Abu Ghraib (Ashgate, 2012) 44.  
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violence of the racialised other.83 The torture memos, and the masculinist ideology that inspired 
them,84 could take root easily in such a fertile environment. Torture is ‘not a simple dyadic 
relationship’ as the ticking bomb scenario would have it; rather torture occurs in complex 
organisational contexts that are intersected by constructions of masculinity, gender and race.85 
Hyper ‘masculine socialisation’ is at play in armed conflict and counterinsurgency.86 The 
interaction of gender, race and class in armed conflict and in imperial and counterinsurgency 
contexts is essential to understanding torture.87  
 
This interaction was represented in the Abu Ghraib photographs and the scandal of, as Khalili 
puts it, the ‘transgressive women’ torturers.88 The mainstream and media monstering of the 
female soldiers at Abu Ghraib ‘trafficked in gendered stereotypes’.89 In so doing, they missed 
how gender roles were being performed, in what Kaufman-Osborn has called a ‘logic of 
emasculation’: the aim of the disciplinary techniques was ‘to strip prisoners of their masculine 
gender identity and turn them into caricatures of terrified and often infantilized femininity’.90 
The emasculating and homoerotic approach to torture at Abu Ghraib91 was underpinned by 
racism at the highest levels, where the intentional exploitation of ‘the Arab mind’ was part of 
the enhanced interrogation narrative.92 The prominence of sexual violence and sexual 
humiliation at Abu Ghraib reflected the long-standing Orientalist interpretation of the Muslim 
or Arab world as sexually repressed and homophobic. Torture at Abu Ghraib aimed at 
exploiting this construction of the victims, but this torture was played out through ‘a cultural 
code of masculinity’,93 where, as Caldwell shows, power and control were exerted over the 
male body,94 and their feminization through torture and sexual humiliation served ‘to humiliate 
and mock cultural constructions of masculinity itself’.95 Torture enacted a kind of liberation of 
the repressed Muslim or Arab victim whilst simultaneously enacting the United States ‘as a 
place free of such sexual constraints’.96 The misogyny, homophobia, and racism that drove the 
torture at Abu Ghraib are hard to miss.  
 
Yet, Abu Ghraib has been read as an unfortunate exception and as chaotic, the result of the 
deviance of a few bad apples.97 The ticking bomb scenario is positioned in contrast to Abu 
 
83 Paul Hoch cited in Connell (n 81 above) 75. 
84 See, for example, Seymour M Hersh, ‘The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program came to Abu Ghraib’ 
The New Yorker (16 May 2014) discussing the neo-con view of Iraq, Arabs and violence in the lead up to the 
invasion. 
85 Rejali, ‘Torture makes the man’ (n 79 above) 163. 
86 Eileen L. Zurbriggen, ‘Sexualised torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib prison: Feminist Psychological Analysis’ 
(2008) 18 Feminism and Psychology 301. 
87 Laleh Khalili, ‘Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency’ (2011) 37 Review of International Studies 1471, 
1482. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, ‘Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?’ (2005) 1 Politics & Gender 597, 605. 
90 Ibid 606. 
91 Ryan Ashley Caldwell, Fallgirls: Gender and the Framing of Torture at Abu Ghraib (Ashgate, 2012) 66. 
92 Hersh (n 84 above) cited and discussed in Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times 
(Duke University Press, 2017) 83-84.  
93 Caldwell (n 91 above) 47. 
94 The photos and the publicity around Abu Ghraib have mainly concerned male victims. Women were tortured 
and women were raped, though this has been vastly underreported. See, Puar (n 92 above) 98; see also, Luke 
Harding, ‘The Other Prisoners’ The Guardian (20 May 2004). 
95 Caldwell (n 91 above)16. 
96 Puar (n 92 above) 92. 
97 Caldwell (n 91 above) 1, 44. Rumsfeld says of Abu Ghraib: ‘These acts could not conceivably have been 
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Ghraib: it is the necessary exception to an otherwise commendable rule; in the ticking bomb 
scenario, only what is necessary is done, mechanistically, by a cool, poised, and professional 
public official.  In reality, however, the ticking bomb hypothetical and torture at Abu Ghraib 
are manifestations of the same ideological codes of masculinity. Moreover, torture at Abu 
Ghraib was the product of the ticking bomb exception. That ‘exception’ was negotiated by the 
Bush administration, and was operationalised by the CIA and by the United States military, 
including at Abu Ghraib. 
 
For his part, in coming to terms with the ideology of the ticking bomb scenario, Hannah has 
drawn out the symbiosis between torture and terrorism as characterised by the hypothetical. He 
argues that the ticking bomb scenario is used to represent the geographical extent of, and the 
unacceptably severe extent of, the threat posed by terrorism. Widespread, imminent terrorism 
makes torture seem like a reasonable response: ‘the ticking-bomb scenario prompts a 
reimagining of the landscape of everyday life as suffused with an unacceptably high level of 
risk.’98 But Hannah fails to fully grasp the ideology of the construct. Where Hannah could have 
developed his analysis to show how the ticking bomb scenario is characterised by fear tactics, 
he falls back in to the troubling investigation of the motives of perpetrators and, ultimately, he 
gives the scenario ‘an objective value…he disbands responsibility by presenting the ticking 
bomb scenario back to the authorities as justification for its actions’.99 He remarks, rather 
trustingly: ‘High officials in the Bush administration appear not only to have taken the premises 
of the ticking-bomb scenario seriously but also to have drawn the same permissive conclusions 
regarding torture as have many ethicists’.100 It is important to grasp the significance of this. 
Being awake to the ideology of the ticking bomb scenario reduces the likelihood of slipping 
into a narrative that winds up accepting the state’s rationalisation. 
 
Whilst there have then been many well-argued efforts to diffuse,101 dispose of,102 and otherwise 
dismiss the ticking bomb, such dismantling will only convince those who had not really thought 
about the impracticalities. Even the most benevolent and well-prepared disputant can fall into 
traps when arguing against the ticking bomb scenario on the basis of implausibility. Exposing 
the fallacies of the scenario is unlikely to eliminate its appeal either to those convinced by the 
rare case, or to those who are ideologically committed – consciously or unconsciously – to 
torturing enemies and who have internalised the ticking bomb as their rationale. As well as 
perpetuating a particular ideology of torture, it is also the case, at times, that the exclamation 
that such a scenario would never arise can imply that plausibility is the problem rather than 
torture. In order, then, to understand torture, it is necessary to investigate the ideology that 
founds the ticking bomb scenario to show the ideologically constructed connection between 
torture and interrogation and torture and information. 
 
ii. Shaping torture: the ticking bomb and the purpose of interrogation 
 
The second reason to resist debating the plausibility of a ticking bomb scenario is deeply related 
to this failure to recognise ideology at work. Debating plausibility may, and, more often than 
 
interrogation effort. Rather, they were the senseless crimes of a small group of prison guards who ran amok in the 
absence of adequate supervision’. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Sentinel, 2012) 545. 
98 Matthew Hannah, ‘Torture and the Ticking Bomb: the War on Terrorism as a Geographical Imagination of 
Power/Knowledge’ (2006) 96 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 622 , 623. 
99 Farrell (n 4 above) 132-133. 
100 Hannah (n 98 above) 624. 
101 Association for the Prevention of Torture (n 50 above).  
102 Shue (2006) (n 11 above). 
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not, in my reading, does, signal acceptance of the premise that torture is a purposeful method 
of interrogation. By way of illustration, many commentators raise a point about competence 
through the question, ‘who will torture?’103 Brecher, in asking this question, makes a significant 
point:  
 
The first reason why the ticking bomb scenario remains a fantasy, and not a description 
of a rare but realistic possibility, is that it fails to distinguish between what you or I might 
do in that imagined case and what you or I could do in an actual case. It fails to distinguish 
between individuals’ possible visceral response and any proper basis of public policy.104 
 
This is significant because the ticking bomb scenario is a poor thought experiment.105 It aims 
to elicit an intuitive response to whether torture is necessary, to whether ‘you’ would torture;106 
the layperson debating this scenario is, however, incompetent to answer. As such, the ticking 
bomb scenario is presented to persuade the listener rather than to get them thinking.  
 
However, and more importantly, raising the issue of incompetence is not an ethical strategy of 
dismissal. Consider Shue’s incompetence-based rebuttal: ‘…it is simply dreamy to think that 
all of a sudden we are simply going to stumble upon someone who happens to have the skills 
to make a man who planted a ticking bomb reverse the direction of his life and assist us in 
defusing his bomb.’107 The abstraction here is quite startling. Arguing against the plausibility 
of the ticking bomb scenario on the basis that only trained torturers could torture concretises 
the idea of a profession of interrogational torture and simultaneously imagines away the reality 
that torturers do exist, fully trained and otherwise. Dreaming up a torturer-free world of 
deficient proficiency as an argument to counteract the ticking bomb scenario is, at best, 
misrepresentative, at worst, perverse.  
 
Ginbar undertakes a similarly problematic discussion108 of the ‘institutionalisation trap’, as part 
of his more general examination of the slippery slope and other dangers of states resorting to 
torture in ticking bomb situations.109 Apparently to demonstrate the bureaucratisation that 
would be required in a world where torture would be lawful or permissible – and seemingly 
effective or successful – in ticking bomb scenarios, Ginbar depicts institutionalisation in great 
detail:  
 
I would therefore submit that, in a state facing terrorism, the pro-torture reasoning 
inevitably calls for sending in professionals: for example, martial arts experts (perhaps 
 
103 Brecher (n 58 above) 21. See also, Shue (2006) (n 11 above) 236-7. 
104 Brecher (n 58 above) 22. 
105 For a useful discussion of thought experiments in political theory, an argument in favour of distinguishing 
between relevant and irrelevant hypotheticals and a careful consideration of the ticking bomb thought experiment, 
see Mathias Thaler, ‘Unhinged Frames: Assessing Thought Experiments in Normative Political Theory’ (2018) 
48 British Journal of Political Science 1119. 
106 Farrell (n 4 above) 8. 
107 Shue may make this point somewhat tongue in cheek – at any rate, by ‘assist us in defusing his bomb’ he 
almost certainly means ‘assist us in providing information’. Shue (2006) (n 11 above) 237. 
108 Ginbar’s examination of torture is thorough insofar as he does not examine the ticking bomb scenario in the 
abstract only. He examines the practice of a number of states where the ticking bomb scenario has been used. He 
is convinced by some state justifications for using the ticking bomb scenario: ‘Neither Israel nor the USA have 
succeeded in limiting torture to ticking bomb situations…Both states claim, probably rightly in some specific 
cases, that torturing (not so named) has thwarted terrorist attacks and saved lives…’ But he is critical of the way 
in which that scenario has been used to justify expansive use of torture and he favours overall the absolute 
prohibition against torture. Ginbar (n 3 above) 264. 
109 Ginbar (n 3 above) 112, 133-34. 
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assisted by neurologists) would teach interrogators where and how to hit a detainee in 
order to achieve the desired effect. And for such interrogations to be truly efficient, other 
physicians must be attached to our crack interrogation unit, as people are not 
physiologically uniform, and minute-by-minute monitoring is required, to ensure that the 
right (or exact) amount of pain is administered. Similarly, psychologists or psychiatrists 
must be on the scene, to advise interrogators as to the methods that would be most 
efficient against the particular individual, and monitor the effect of the methods used on 
the terrorist's willpower, endurance and sanity. Where the use of methods…such as rape, 
electric shocks, and so on, is deemed unavoidable, properly trained and equipped staff 
should similarly be available. The same is true…of methods such as loud music, white 
noise, extreme heat and cold—and even ‘stress positions’ and sleep deprivation.110   
 
It may seem surprising that the quoted passage was written as part of Ginbar’s defence of a 
minimal absolutist prohibition against torture. In constructing that position, Ginbar may have 
felt it necessary to paint for his readers, and the pro-torture commentators, just what it is that 
they are supporting when they advocate for the use of torture in catastrophic cases. In so doing, 
however, he concretises the idea that torture is for the purpose of retrieving information, that it 
requires a professional skill set.  
 
There should be an adage in these debates about straying on to the ‘slippery slopes’ and 
winding up as the torturer’s accomplice. The ticking bomb scenario in these debates is a 
thought experiment, a hypothetical, but torture is not. Torture is practised and there are 
torturers. Beyond the debates, the ticking bomb scenario is, therefore, more than a thought 
experiment. It is an ideology that is invoked by states to justify practices and policies of 
torture.111  
 
iii. Shaping justification: the ticking bomb, policy and the state 
 
Finally, then, and intimately connected to the previous point, dismissing the ticking bomb 
scenario as implausible ignores the extent to which it is the touchstone in practice for states 
and perpetrators to justify their use of torture. In the sense that states do employ ticking bomb 
justifications, there is something very real about the scenario.  
 
States may invoke the ticking bomb scenario directly, as the Landau Commission of Inquiry 
famously did in Israel in 1987.112 Ticking bomb logic underpinned the Landau Commission’s 
decision, as part of that inquiry, to authorise the General Security Services to use ‘moderate 
physical pressure’ during the interrogation of Palestinians suspected of engagement in acts of 
terrorism.113 The ticking bomb continues to provide the basis for the application of the necessity 
defense, following the use of torture (or supposed ‘special interrogation methods’) in Israeli 
Security Agency interrogations.114 For its part, the Bush administration did not directly quote 
the kind of catastrophic case imagined in the ticking bomb scenario but it did couch its policy 
in the impending threat of terrorism, in an environment in which the ticking bomb was 
 
110 Ginbar (n 3 above) 134. 
111 Farrell (n 4 above) 8. Hannah (n 98 above) 623. 
112 ‘Excerpts of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security 
Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity’ (1989) 23 Israel Law Review 146. 
113 Farrell (n 4 above)109. 
114 Elena Chakho, ‘Tabish v. Attorney General and the Legal Framework Governing Physical Coercion in ISA 
Interrogations’ Lawfare (6 December 2018) available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/tabish-v-attorney-general-
and-legal-framework-governing-physical-coercion-isa-interrogations.  
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omnipresent. The ticking bomb scenario supplied ‘the imagery’ for Bush and his 
administration.115 Bybee’s infamous 2002 memo reflects the imagery: ‘If a government 
defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might 
arguably violate Section 2340A, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on 
the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network’.116 The doctrine of necessity, according to 
the memo, allowed supersession of the prohibition on torture.117 
 
The practice in Israel provides a striking contemporary illustration of the use of the ticking 
bomb scenario both as a blanket justification for the practice of torture and as a backstop for 
political or legal scrutiny of that use of torture.118 The Landau Commission authorised the use 
of ‘moderate physical pressure’ in interrogations, in their reasoning, to prevent impending acts 
of terrorism. The Commission opined that the use of ‘moderate physical pressure’ would be 
justified, ex ante, under the necessity defence, for the purpose of obtaining any information 
that could contribute to foiling potential acts of terrorism: 
 
…the information which an interrogator can obtain from the suspect, about caches of 
explosive materials in the possession or the knowledge of the suspect, about acts of 
terrorism which are about to be perpetrated, about the members of a terrorist group to 
which he belongs, about the headquarters of terrorist organizations inside the country or 
abroad, and about terrorist training camps – any such information can prevent mass 
killing and individual terrorist acts which are about to be carried out.119 
 
The Commission explained what it meant by a ticking bomb situation: ‘And indeed, when the 
clock wired to the explosive charge is already ticking, what difference does it make, in terms 
of the necessity to act, whether the charge is certain to be detonated in five minutes or in five 
days?’120 As such, the Landau Commission reasoned that physical pressure could escalate in 
time with the detonator – but the act itself rather than danger or time was the important point 
of imminence.  
 
This authorisation of the use of ‘moderate physical pressure’ was the subject of a famous 
decision before the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, in 1999. In that 
decision, the Court determined that methods employed by the General Security Services 
surpassed the requirements of a reasonable investigation and that the general advance 
authorisation of techniques of interrogation, so called ‘moderate physical pressure’, under the 
necessity defence was incompatible with Israeli law.121 However, the Court also allowed that 
the necessity defense, which precludes criminal liability, might be available to an interrogator 
 
115 Hannah (n 98 above) 624. 
116 Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, ‘Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340–2340A, 1 August 2002, cited in Greenberg and Dratel (n 7 above) 213. 
117 Michael P. Scharf and Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) 188. 
118 For a discussion (that reads as quite cavalier given the subject matter) of the ticking bomb scenario in national 
news, see Yonah Jeremy Bob, ‘Shin Bet enhanced interrogations to stop ticking bombs – legal or torture?’ The 
Jerusalem Post (21 October 2017) available at https://www.jpost.com/International/Ticking-bomb-507917. For 
his discussion of the outcome of that case, see Yonah Jeremy Bob, ‘High Court: enhanced interrogations was legal 
to ‘ticking bomb’’ The Jerusalem Post (20 June 2018) available at https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/High-
Court-Enhanced-interrogation-was-legal-to-stop-ticking-bomb-517905.  
119 ‘Excerpts’ (n 112 above) 172. 
120 Ibid 174. 
121 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al . v. Government of Israel et al., HCJ 5100/94 (6 September 
1999) paras. 32, 33, 35. 
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ex post facto in ‘appropriate circumstances’ of immediate need, as provided for in Israeli penal 
law:    
 
…we are prepared to accept…that the “necessity defense” can arise in instances of 
‘ticking bombs,’ and that the phrase ‘immediate need’ in the statute refers to the 
imminent nature of the act rather than that of the danger. Hence, the imminence criteria 
is satisfied even if the bomb is set to explode in a few days, or perhaps even after a few 
weeks, provided the danger is certain to materialize and there is no alternative means of 
preventing its materialization.122 
 
The Court left it to the Attorney General to determine the fallout of this ambiguous reasoning.123 
The Attorney General reacted by issuing a document outlining the guidelines according to 
which he would instruct himself in such cases – the so-called internal guidelines.124 Rather than 
outlawing torture, this decision simply reoriented the way in which torture was managed. As 
Mann has written, the decision, whilst lauded for its rejection of torture and defence of human 
dignity, entrenched abusive interrogation methods.125  
 
Ticking bomb logic continues to underpin the Israeli security forces’ use of torture.126 That 
logic has been endorsed in two recent high-profile cases before the Supreme Court, sitting as 
the High Court of Justice.127 Most recently, the Court, in Tbeish,128 dismissed the applicant’s 
challenge to the lawfulness of the Israel Security Service (ISA) internal guidelines on special 
interrogation methods. The applicant also challenged the Attorney General’s failure to order a 
criminal investigation into his allegations of torture in interrogation. The security services had 
applied so-called ‘special interrogation techniques’ to the applicant during interrogation. He 
was suspected of involvement in ‘a plot to collect and conceal a large quantity of dangerous 
weapons, with the intention of using them for the perpetration of terrorist activity’.129 The Court 
held:  
 
Under these circumstances, in which the danger that led to the use of the special means 
in the interrogation was certainly real; the attack that the interrogation sought to prevent 
was serious harm to human life; the ISA interrogators had no other means for obtaining 
the information about the weapons stockpile hidden in a storage unit, and of the plans to 
perpetrate terrorist attacks; and the special means employed in the interrogation were… 
proportionate relative to the serious threat that their use was intended to frustrate – I am 
of the opinion that the finding of the Director that “employing the special means of 
 
122 Ibid para. 34.  
123 Ibid para. 38. 
124 Mordechai Kremnitzer and Re’em Segev, ‘The Legality of Interrogational Torture: A Question of Proper 
Authorization or a Substantive Moral Issue?’ (2000) 34 Israel Law Review 509, 541; Itamar Mann and Omer 
Shatz, ‘The Necessity Procedure: Laws of Torture in Israel and Beyond, 1987–2009’ (2010) 6 Unbound: Harvard 
Journal of the Legal Left 59, 72 . 
125 Itamar Mann, ‘The law behind torture’ Boston Review (15 December 2014) available at 
http://bostonreview.net/blog/itamar-mann-torture-necessity-legal-israel-united-
states/?utm_source=Sprout&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Twitter; see also, Mann and Shatz (n 124 
above) 72.  
126 Yotam Berger, ‘Israeli High Court ruling may make it easier for interrogators to use violence’ Haaretz (30 
November 2018) available at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-high-court-ruling-may-
make-it-easier-for-interrogators-to-use-violence-1.6701416.  
127 Tbeish v. Attorney General et al HCJ 9018/17 (26 November 2018); As’ad Abu Gosh et al v. Attorney General 
et al HCJ 5722/12 (12 December 2017). 
128 Tbeish v. Attorney General et al HCJ 9018/17 (26 November 2018). See, Ben-Natan (n 34 above). 
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interrogation under the circumstances, falls within the purview of the necessity defense” 
is well founded.130 
 
Agreeing with Justice Elron, Justice I. Amit held: 
 
The case before us is not one of a classic “ticking bomb” that may explode any minute, 
but…the immediacy requirement in…the Penal Law…concerns the immediacy of the act 
and not the immediacy of the danger. In the present case, the combination of the 
seriousness the nearly-certain danger (sic), if not the certainty of the realization of the 
danger, and the inability to act in an alternative manner in the concrete situation that 
faced the security authorities (the necessity condition) in order to obtain information that 
would very probably thwart a real danger of life-threatening terrorist activity – all lead 
to the conclusion that the proportionate act adopted by the ISA interrogators falls under 
the aegis of the necessity defense.131  
 
The ticking bomb is the basis for a policy of torture – euphemised as special interrogation 
techniques – in Israel. The construct provides the imagery, the rationale and the justification 
for the use of torture. The judiciary, to date, has simply consolidated a ticking bomb-based 
ideology of torture.  
 
The extensive commentary challenging the plausibility of the ticking bomb scenario and 
deconstructing ticking bomb logic might greet a decision like this with exasperation that this 
is not a real ticking bomb scenario or that this is evidence of the problem of the slippery slope. 
That approach mistakes an ideology of torture for some kind of wayward fuzzy logic. Torture 
by the state of Israel demonstrates fully the way in which the ticking bomb scenario is 
operationalised to neutralise the ideology of torture. 
 
c. Adopting a stance: ‘Gotcha!’132 
 
The final point of departure, in the torture and ticking bomb debate, which merits cautious 
handling is the participation through an ‘in my view’ moral or ethical argumentative approach. 
Whilst the prospect of engaging in the debate on torture and the ticking bomb scenario by 
presenting moral or even legal arguments on one side or the other is alluring (and can generate 
very thoughtful work),133 it is often a debate that gets nowhere.134 One moral proposition or 
legal innovation trumps another and, along the way, the few who defend torture earn too many 
concessions from those who condemn it. In this respect, taking a position risks accepting a 
ticking bomb scenario as a legitimate starting point; even the most committed deontologist by, 
in any way, engaging with the ins and outs of the ticking bomb scenario has already had to 
make a compromise. More specifically, by entering ‘slippery slope’ territory, consequentialists 
 
130 Tbeish para. 59. 
131 Ibid, Justice I. Amit, para. 2. 
132 See, n 75 above. Luban (n 45 above) 1427.  See also Waldron’s point that the hypothetical is designed 
‘deliberately to undermine the integrity of certain moral positions’: Jeremy Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law: 
Jurisprudence for the White House’ (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1681, 1715. 
133 For an interesting account of what is morally wrong with torture, for example, see, David Sussman, ‘What’s 
Wrong with Torture’ (2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1. 
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against torture concede the starting point – what happens on the slippery slope is portrayed as 
the problem.135  
 
In respect to the all too common approach of ethical inquiry into the purported moral dilemma 
of torturing in ticking bomb circumstances, abstraction is the governing frame of analysis. The 
ticking bomb ‘equivocates on what is relevant for consideration’ and erases awkward 
realities.136 The commentator’s application of an ethical inquiry in this context doubly abstracts 
because the ethical analysis is rooted in moral intuitionism or a judgement-call about torture 
and about the ticking bomb; moral intuitionism and judgement calls about torture are 
necessarily subjective and learned, often from fictional depiction;137 reflection on the ticking 
bomb is necessarily informed by the extent to which the topic of, and threat of, terrorism has 
dominated both the international and national agendas, and media coverage in recent years,138 
and the extent to which  the idea of a ticking bomb suddenly exploding exploits ‘our greatest 
fears’.139 Moral intuitionism on the use of torture in ticking bomb scenarios is, as such, 
ideologically primed, unconnected to reality and history.  
 
2. ‘Interrogational Torture’: Misconstruing Context as Method 
 
The very idea that torture may be understood as a method of interrogation, or categorised as 
‘interrogational torture’, assumes there are different categories of torture according to the 
purpose for which it is being applied; it also suggests that these categories are distinct – they 
derive somehow from the character of the torturer – the professional interrogator, the sadist, 
the monster. In debates about the efficacy of torture and about the ticking bomb scenario, it is 
assumed that torture is a method of interrogation, and its success as a method is implied or 
assumed. This compartmentalisation of torture according to its purpose is, more often than not, 
taken for granted by those who debate torture in ticking bomb scenarios and ‘is accepted by 
both absolutists and apologists’.140 The categorisation is pervasive in the literature;141 
commentators have developed a kind of taxonomy of torture: there is interrogational torture, 
terroristic torture, judicial torture, punitive torture, sadistic torture, and deterrent torture 
 
135 See, for example, Sumner B. Twiss, ‘Torture, Justification and Human Rights: Toward an Absolute 
Proscription’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 346, 360; Marcy Strauss, ‘Torture’ (2004) 48 New York Law 
School Law Review 201, 267;  
136 Farrell (n 4 above) 242. 
137 For a discussion of how public perception is informed by popular depiction of torture, see, Casey Delahunty 
and Erin Kearns, ‘Wait, there’s torture in Zootopia? Examining the Prevalence of Torture in Popular Movies’ 
February 2019 available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3342908.  
138 On this point, see Lucia Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice’ 
(2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 507, 511.  
139 Lucia Zedner, ‘The Concept of Security: An agenda for comparative analysis’ (2003) 23 Legal Studies 153, 
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459. 
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Torture (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 7-8. His taxonomy of the types of torture lists: judicial; punitive; 
interrogational; dehumanizing; terroristic/deterrent; and sadistic torture. For some examples of the use of the 
distinct category of ‘interrogational torture’, see, Oren Gross, ‘The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the 
Law’ in Sanford Levinson (ed.), Torture: A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 229, 232, using 
the term ‘preventive interrogational torture’; Stephan Kershnar, ‘For Interrogational Torture’ (2005) 19 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 223; Kremnitzer and Segev (n 124 above) 509; Patrick Lee, 
‘Interrogational Torture’ (2006) 51 American Journal of Jurisprudence 131; Sussman, (n 133 above) 4; 
Christopher Tindale, ‘The Logic of Torture: A critical examination’ (1996) 22 Social Theory and Practice 349, 
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amongst the categories. Interrogational torture, then, is not to be conflated with terroristic or 
sadistic torture. 
 
Shue was misled by this approach in 1978. He distinguished ‘terroristic torture’ from 
‘interrogational torture’. The former involved the always unjustifiable ‘goal of the intimidation 
of people other than the victim’.142 Interrogational torture, ‘for the purpose of extracting 
information’, could, in a pure case, ‘satisfy the constraint of possible compliance, since it offers 
an escape, in the form of providing the information wanted by the torturers, which affords some 
protection against further assault’.143 Shue was sceptical of the ability of the victim to bring the 
torture to an end through compliance. Significantly, he also recognised that ‘very few instances 
of torture are likely to fall entirely within the category of interrogational torture’.144 In making 
the latter point, Shue almost grasped a crucial, yet subtle, difference between interrogation as 
the context, or setting, for torture and torture as a method of interrogation. His observations 
were, however, overshadowed by his presentation of the possibility of pure interrogational 
torture in that rare, isolated case. In failing to fully let go of the ‘rare case’, he was precluded 
from differentiating between interrogation as the context for torture and interrogation as a 
justification for torture. Understanding this difference is essential to cracking the ‘enigmas of 
denial and bad faith encoded within the language we use to converse with ourselves’ about 
torture.145 Indeed, given the interrogation room’s ubiquity as the setting for torture, almost all 
torture happens in an interrogational setting – but this environmental context is generally, and 
dangerously, substituted for method, purpose, and motive. The decision of the Bush 
administration policy-makers to rename torture ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ was 
parasitic on this rationalisation of torture. What better way to represent and repackage torture 
than to use the language of enhanced interrogation – interrogation for information to stop a 
bomb. 
 
Whilst much has been written about the objective of torture and about torture’s efficacy, few 
have really considered the way in which the rhetoric around torture creates an understanding 
of torture.146 Words matter.147 Torture is widely considered to be a method of interrogation 
because we call it a method of interrogation. Because they do not suit the narrative, are less 
intuitive and more difficult to grasp, accounts which complicate, and disrupt this reproduction 
of torture simply do not prevail. It is easier – more intuitive – to accept the categories.  
 
Crelinsten, however, writing in a pre-11 September environment, did manage to articulate the 
complexity of torture. He saw that torture was understood to revolve around interrogation but, 
he argued, ‘it is more complex than this’.148 Whilst perpetrators usually excuse their use of 
torture on the basis of the need to get information or a confession, Crelinsten identified in these 
excuses that there was more at stake than ‘making them talk’. Crelinsten saw that this excuse 
of ‘“making them talk” is also about power, about imposing one’s will on another’.149 
Crelinsten advocated against the simplification of torture in to categories and torturers in to 
typologies. Crelinsten’s grasp of the complexity both  of torture and of the torturer’s purposes 
means that he was able to decipher the debates about torture’s acceptability, in the post 11 
 
142 Shue, Torture (n 8 above) 131. 
143 Ibid, 134. 
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September environment, for what they were – an important element of the construction of a 
reality in which torture can be seen as acceptable: ‘To enable torture to be practised 
systematically and routinely, to be taken for granted and even to be celebrated, not only do 
torturers have to be trained and prepared, but wider elements of society must also be prepared 
and, in a sense, trained to accept that such things go on.’150 So torturers needed to be trained - 
in the sense that they need to be conditioned to accept a new reality and made morally malleable 
to the dehumanisation of the enemy – and persuaded of the need for torture, in order that they 
can serve the interests of the state. Simultaneously, the public or society needs to be made 
amenable to torture. The production of torture as interrogational – purposeful and necessary in 
ticking bomb situations – is part of this ideological landscaping. 
 
On the purposes or goals of torture, Asad has said:   
 
Critics sometimes claim that ‘the extraction of information’ is not the real goal of torture, 
but rather torture’s justification. But I suggest that there is no such thing as ‘the real goal 
of torture’ The motives (conscious and unconscious) of someone who carries out specific 
acts of torture are usually varied and mixed. The idea that specific acts of torture should 
be understood by the agent’s motivation is either circular or based on the sentimental 
(and false) belief that only peculiar psychosocial types are capable of great cruelty.151 
 
In making this point about the absence of a true goal of torture, Asad does seem to somewhat 
underestimate the significance of understanding information extraction as the justification for 
torture, rather than its purpose. This distinction between justification and purpose is essential 
to grasping the ideology of modern torture. It should not be assumed, though, that, by pursuing 
the exposure of ideology, there is an inevitable next step of pursuing, or discovering, truth; that 
is to say, by exposing the ideology we do not simply reveal the true goal of torture.152 However, 
on the whole, Asad’s observation is critical; he silences the sirens.153 Asad’s decisive 
contribution is in his de-rationalisation of torture. The dominant rationalisation for torture 
today is on the basis of its supposed interrogational purpose – the assumption that torture is or 
can be a method of interrogation. But Asad topples the myth of the good torturer pursuing a 
particular goal. Our intuitions are primed to view the torture of a member of the political 
resistance in a dictatorial regime as entirely distinguishable from the torture of a ‘ticking bomb’ 
terrorist or a kidnapper in a liberal democracy. The distinguishing feature between these 
tortures, however, is our standpoint. The idea of interrogational torture as distinguishable from 
terroristic, sadistic, communicative or punitive torture is not sustainable under historical and 
contextual examination.  
 
Klein, more sharply than many other thinkers, has grasped the function of torture. In attempting 
to convince a potential interviewee to speak to her – an interviewee who had experienced 
devastating psychological experimentation at the hands of researchers at McGill University in 
the 1950s – Klein explained her research interest in the interviewee as follows: ‘I recently 
travelled to Iraq, and I am trying to understand the role torture is playing there. We are told it’s 
about getting information, but I think it’s more than that – I think it may also have to do with 
trying to build a model country, about erasing people and then trying to remake them from 
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scratch.’154 Through her study of how the CIA used psychological experimental research 
(research which, in part, aimed at breaking down and rebuilding individuals who had mental 
health problems) in its development of an interrogation programme in the 1950s, and her 
observations on torture in Iraq and in the ‘war on terror’, Klein has understood torture as about 
unmaking bodies and minds, so that they can be remade or rebuilt. Klein’s understanding 
evokes the civilising mission: civilising the uncivilised, by breaking and remaking, through 
torture.  
 
3. Torture and the Civilising Mission 
 
This link between torture in Iraq and the civilising mission maps on to the wider reading of the 
2004 invasion of Iraq, the underpinning Bush doctrine, and, indeed, the wider ‘war on terror’, 
as imperial in character, as ‘yet another version of the civilising mission’.155 For Anghie, the 
identification of Iraq as a ‘rogue state’, ripe for liberation and transformation, the expansionist 
arguments around the use of force, encapsulated in the Bush doctrine’s policy of pre-emption, 
and the strategic engagement of rights arguments to justify the invasion, all demonstrate, and 
replicate, the old imperial order.156 The imperial nature of the Bush doctrine, which included 
this expansionist interpretation of the rules on the use of force, and self-defence, is evidenced 
in the Third World’s exclusion from use of the doctrine whilst being subject to its application 
and elaboration.157 The legal manoeuvres through which the ‘war on terror’ was established – 
including the Bush doctrine of self-defence, the reinterpretation of the ‘laws of armed conflict’, 
the rhetoric around ‘unlawful combatants’,158 and the necessity exception to the laws 
prohibiting torture – were an exercise in legitimating war against an ‘uncivilised’ other.159  
 
This understanding of the ‘war on terror’ and the Iraq war echoes, and continues, the European 
conquest, and ‘civilisation’, of the ‘uncivilised’ world.160 That conquest was legitimated 
through the civilising mission – the colonised were excluded from the universal, civilised 
norms or values of the colonial state, whilst being subject to their application and elaboration. 
As Anghie writes, the civilizing mission ‘has justified colonialism as a means of redeeming the 
backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-European world by 
incorporating them into the universal civilization of Europe’.161 International law was both 
complicit in, and shaped by, the colonial encounter. It was used to legitimate colonialism and 
exploitation and colonial practices fed back in to its normative architecture.  
 
A French concept,162 civilisation connotes the opposite to barbarianism; to civilise means to 
bring out of barbarism or savagery. The civilising mission is a French imperial doctrine. As 
France extended its colonial empire in the latter part of the 19th century, ‘French publicists, and 
subsequently politicians, declared that their government alone among the Western states had a 
special mission to civilise the indigenous peoples now coming under its control – what the 
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French called their mission civilisatrice’, Conklin explains.163 For those who supported the 
French empire and who were immersed in the idea of bettering ‘dependent peoples’, this was 
an enunciated creed.164 But the French were not alone in this ideology. Other imperial powers 
shared this claim of bringing civilisation to the colonies.165 As Fanon reveals, their claims rested 
on the ‘systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other 
person all attributes of humanity’.166 
 
The civilising mission dovetailed with international law in Empire’s favour. Kiernan describes 
‘the colonial scene, where no international law obtained’.167 For the colonists, international law 
was unavailable to the colonial subject.168 In international legal terms, the colony lacked legal 
personality and sovereignty, was incapable of partaking in international law, and, accordingly, 
imperial powers were free from the ‘legal constraints on the use of violence (to subjugate and 
pacify native populations) that bound them in their relationships with one another and their 
own metropolitan populations’.169 International law was not absent. Colonial conquest was 
justified through international legal language. As such, international law was both 
universalised and shaped in a racialised context.170 As the Third World Approaches to 
International Law scholarship has shown, the hierarchies and biases, formalised in the colonies 
persist in international law and institutions.171  
 
The torture prohibition and the ticking bomb scenario are part of this history. The abolition of 
judicial torture in Europe was almost complete by the end of the eighteenth century.172 This 
history of abolition has been translated in to two fairy-tales, which, combined, have aided the 
construction of torture as aberrational, a violation of the norm. The first fairy-tale presents 
abolition as driven by enlightenment humanitarianism; the second fairy-tale has the happiest 
of endings – the near complete abolition of torture. In reality, judicial torture was abandoned 
as it was no longer required by the law of proof.173 Torture continued, not least in the colonies.  
 
In the era of decolonisation – and the overlapping era of human rights, the laws of armed 
conflict, and media and civil society scrutiny – it was difficult to justify torture on the basis of 
the necessity to civilise or pacify the racially inferior or savage colonial subject. It was certainly 
not possible to justify torture on the basis of the imperial need to create political subjects 
amenable to the retention of the colony. As such, the ticking bomb – the ‘interrogation’ of the 
lawless terrorist – became the face of the civilising mission. The ticking bomb justification for 
the use of torture crystallised in the colony. Torture at Abu Ghraib exposed this dark 
underbelly. But the state has a way of arguing away torture, burying its realities in the rotten 
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apples and necessity exceptions. As with the practice of torture in the French-Algerian war, the 
state’s narrative on Abu Ghraib predominated.  
 
a. Translating the civilising mission in to ticking bomb: The French Algerian War 
 
The practice of torture in Algeria is particularly useful both for understanding the infatuation 
with the ticking bomb scenario and for pouring cold water on that infatuation. However, despite 
the wealth of stellar research on torture during the French Algerian War and the Battle of 
Algiers, in particular, the torturer’s perspective has prevailed. There are a couple of broad 
illustrations to support that claim.  
 
First, the ticking bomb justification, which is so ubiquitous today, has its roots in the French 
Algerian war – it was during that war that this justification was most explicitly internalised and 
wielded.174 In the aftermath of the war, the justification was truly conceptualised. Today, the 
ticking bomb scenario is a globalised construct. Less ubiquitous in contemporary debates is 
awareness of the systematic practice of torture, and the reasons for that brutal practice, by the 
French during the war. 
 
Second, the sheer power of the French state both to censor voices and to amnesty crimes means 
that it was able to shape the discourse.175 French torturers have been given numerous platforms 
to air their version of events. Following Algerian independence and the end of the war, military 
personnel took the opportunity to impart their experience, and knowledge, of perpetrating 
torture. French torturers gave advice and instruction in the United States,176 Argentina177 and 
other countries.178 Victims, on the other hand, were silenced both during the war,179 and in their 
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subsequent efforts to secure any kind of accountability.180 Public opinion in France turned 
against the war, in part, because of the outcry at the use of torture; however, the outrage, 
arguably, failed to fill the public memory.  
 
From the outset, the French state repressed the fresh memory of its activities in Algeria. The 
fact that torture in Algeria was both structural and approved by the highest authorities181 has 
only recently begun to be acknowledged.182 Official discourse mediated the history of torture – 
only when it had to – as aberrant, the work of individuals acting alone;183 subsequent leaders 
failed to condemn the systematic practice of torture. Individual military personnel were, 
though, given spaces and opportunities to explain and justify their use of torture. All the while, 
public and popular discourse facilitated legitimation through the image of the good torturer and 
the ticking bomb.184 Historical amnesia in France has been accompanied by what Lazreg 
describes as the exercise of ‘monopoly over meaning’ enabling the empire ‘to reproduce itself, 
by deconstructing itself with one hand, and recomposing itself with the other’.185  
 
i. Towards torture: strategy, law, ideology 
 
The use of torture by the French was underpinned by strategies of ‘revolutionary warfare’, 
advocated in particular by figures such as Trinquier, who Maran describes as having provided 
the French army with the ‘theoretical’ justifications for the use of torture. In Algeria, as 
elsewhere, euphemisms for the word torture were, unsurprisingly, employed.186 Revolutionary 
warfare established that the violence of terrorism countenanced an equivalently violent 
response and that information about the terrorist’s next move was essential to thwart the 
random attacks, justifying coercion.187 French theories of revolutionary warfare later migrated 
to the United States.188 
 
In his memoirs, La Vraie Battaille, Massu, commander of French forces in Algeria during the 
Battle of Algiers, acknowledged the use of torture, though he disputed both its severity and the 
extent to which it was used; he went to great lengths, however, to justify its use in reference to 
the necessity of gaining ‘urgent operational information’.189 His men tortured thousands.190 
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Unambiguously referencing revolutionary warfare, he saw the savagery of the enemy as having 
compelled their ferocious response. Massu’s outlook signifies and continues a deep history, 
exposed by Mégret, of anthropologising the savage as ‘incapable of showing restraint in 
warfare’.191 In an about turn, in 2000, in an interview in Le Monde, Massu expressed his regret 
at the use of torture in Algeria, admitting that it had been not been useful or necessary and 
acknowledging that things could have been done differently.192 
 
Aussaresses illustrates how justificatory logic circulated within the police and intelligence 
forces. He narrates a conversation in Philippeville, in which a police officer confronted him 
with a ticking bomb-like dilemma, as the turning point in his own attitude towards the necessity 
of torture.193 Although Ausseresses resolutely defended his actions, on the basis of urgency and 
necessity, until the end of his life, his own memoirs depict torture in Algeria as a routine method 
of ‘intelligence-gathering’ and the necessity justification as a defence mechanism internalised 
by a brutal, remorseless, torturer.  
 
So-called revolutionary warfare was facilitated within a legal regime characterised by 
emergency powers, providing ‘the executive with an almost totalitarian mandate to introduce 
by administrative order any form of repressive measures it saw fit’.194 Although ‘the army was 
in charge’, by 1957, when police powers were transferred by Lacoste to the military, under 
Massu,195 the ‘conflict’ was, nevertheless, treated, by France as an internal affair – an 
insurrection or revolution; the opposition were cast as terrorists or outlaws.196 Absent 
sovereignty, and incapable anyway of obeying it, according to French thinking, the Algerians 
did not benefit from international humanitarian law. Combatant status simply did not apply.  
 
Revolutionary warfare and emergency powers were deadly bedfellows. It was the civilising 
mission, however, that provided the ideological pillar in the violent trilogy that allowed 
systematic torture against the Algerians. Revolutionary warfare encouraged justificatory 
thinking and emergency powers permitted the French forces to place the FLN and other 
detainees outside of any protective legal order. But the civilising mission drove French policy.  
 
For the French, Algeria was the ‘lynchpin of the French empire’, its jewel, its most intimate 
colonial conquest. Algeria was France.197 The government and military claimed that, in Algeria, 
the French were upholding the ‘highest principles of the French republican tradition’;198 French 
 
191 Mégret (n 158 above) 289. 
192 Jean Planchais and Florence Beaugé, ‘Jacques Massu, Le géneral repenti’ Le Monde  (22 May 2008) available: 
https://www.lemonde.fr/le-monde-2/article/2008/05/22/jacques-massu-le-general-
repenti_1048161_1004868.html; see also Farrell (n 4 above) 100.   
193 Aussaresses, Services Spéciaux (n 176 above) 31. He writes:  
Imagine a situation in which you are opposed in principle to the use of torture and you have arrested an 
individual who is clearly involved in the preparation of an attack. the suspect refuses to talk. You do 
nothing. As a result, a particularly deadly attack ensues. What would you say to the parents of the victims, 
for example, to the parents of a child, mutilated by the bomb, to justify the fact that you failed to do 
whatever possible to make the suspect talk? (author’s translation). 
194 Neil MacMaster, ‘Torture: from Algiers to Abu Ghraib’ (2004) 46 Race & Class 1, 6 . For a detailed 
explanation of the legal framework in place as well as the use, and effect, of emergency powers in Algeria during 
the war, see Farrell (n 4 above) 84-95. 
195 Farrell (n 4 above) 7. 
196 Eldon van Cleef Greenberg, ‘Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution’ (1970) 11 Harvard International 
Law Journal 37 ,44.  
197 Jennifer E. Sessions, By Sword and by Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Cornell University Press, 
2011) 2, 8, 9. 
198 Evans (n 190 above) 206. 
Malcolm Evans and Jens Modvig (eds), Research Handbook on Torture (Edward Elgar, 2020). 
Final author submitted version; not for citation or circulation 
 29 
civilisation, in short. Their mission, as they saw it, was to establish peace in Algeria, to bring 
social and economic reform, to liberate the Algerians.199 It may seem contradictory to suggest 
that the civilising mission drove French torture, especially given the centrality of les droits de 
l’homme and the French Declaration to ‘French civilisation’. To understand the civilising 
mission, it is necessary to come to terms with the dehumanising logic of colonialism and with 
the intersection of colonialism and rights. Torture was necessary in defence of France, of 
civilisation, of Christian values. Maran, in her outstanding examination of the civilising 
mission in the discourse of French government and military personnel, concluded: ‘The shared 
understanding was that France’s presence in Algeria was philanthropic, bringing civilisation to 
Algerians…not least through notions of rights. When this process was disrupted by the 
Algerian revolution, the government acting through its military…took the position that unusual 
means were justified to restore order.’200 Within a racialised settler hierarchy,201 for most, torture 
was also permissible, necessary even, because the adversary, long constructed as, non-equal, 
was not yet fully civilised, not yet fully human. Asad’s evocative words connect the dots 
between torture and the colonised subject: ‘Pain endured in the movement toward becoming 
“fully human,” …was necessary, in the sense that there were social or moral reasons why it 
had to be suffered’.202 Torture was part of the process of creating new human subjects. 
 
Ticking bomb-like thinking and rationalising became rife in the French Algerian war. Such 
logic was pressed into service as part of the civilising mission. French torture was systematic, 
widespread and brutal. That the ticking bomb scenario is the thriving memento of that history 
of torture is a damning indictment of our failure to come to terms either with why torture was 
practised in Algeria and elsewhere or with the colonial encounter, its remnants, 




The many histories of torture overwhelmingly elucidate it as a practice that looks nothing like 
the apologetic portrayal du jour.204 Yet it is the slick assembly of a worthy professional, doing 
only what is necessary, with managed violence, to the reticent terrorist, to stop the bomb which 
has come to dominate our understanding; that is to say, this is the understanding of torture as 
perpetrated by the United States, France, Israel and other ‘western’ states – the practice of 
torture by dictatorships is viewed differently, through a more medieval lens.  
 
Rejali, reflecting on the erasure of the histories and the realities of torture, wondered how the 
ticking bomb scenario is able to bend all argument – and history – to its narrative.205  We can 
continue to reach answers to Rejali’s urgent question by exploring the complex interplay of 
Empire and ideology. Just as – through the act of torture – the victim is broken and remade, 
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civilised, in the eyes of the torturer, so too the history of torture is erased and rebuilt, civilised, 
in the eyes of its authors. The remnants of the colonial encounter are visible everywhere, in 
practices of torture, in discussions on torture and in the law prohibiting torture.  
 
In the recent history of US torture, parallels and links to the French Algerian war abound. There 
were similarities in strategy – warfare, characterised by pre-emptive force necessitated by the 
novelty of the threat;206 in law – the use of emergency powers and the removal of legal 
protection and status, placing the ‘terrorists’ beyond the law; and in ideology – the logic of 
interventionism to liberate and to bring democracy, to defend and extend ‘civilisation’.207 The 
Bush administration worked hard to construe their actions as within the bounds of legality, 
through definitional gymnastics, and reliance on necessity. That history of torture has, 
nevertheless, been examined through the lens of ticking bombs and justificatory or necessity 
logic. Far less attention has been given to the racialised, civilising nature of American conduct.  
 
The same can be said of the academic and popular attention given to the ticking bomb scenario. 
There has been much frenzied typing about this so-called dilemma. Many have accepted the 
construct at face value, failing to grasp the civilising ideology that it conceals. There are 
interlocking reasons for the lethargy in understanding torture. Torture is misunderstood today 
as being for the purpose of obtaining information; there is an utter failure to understand this as 
its justification. Part of the problem lies in the way that the internationally accepted definition 
of torture has reified this justification in law.208 On top of that, we are ‘living within the lie’.209 
As Cohen has argued in respect of our ability to ignore atrocities and suffering, ‘a cultural of 
denial is in place’. 210 Justifications for torture, like the ticking bomb, are part of this denial; 
they ‘have been offered and accepted long enough to be part of the moral fabric’.211 The ticking 
bomb scenario provides a simple and persuasive construct. The construct allows apologists to 
substitute deeply held ideologically beliefs for more acceptable theories of necessity. It allows 
the quieter majority an alternative to subjecting their governments, their values, their 
civilisation to the relentless critique they require. 
 
It was really only in the closing stages of the French Algerian war that the ticking bomb 
scenario was fully formalised in its contemporary, beguiling, urgent construct. Suitably, the 
construct was first set out in a work of fiction,212 Lartéguy’s Les Centurions. Inspired by events 
in the French Algerian war, Les Centurions erases the intimate connection between the ticking 
bomb and the civilising mission. It was far easier to memorialise torture in Algeria, as the novel 
attempts to, through the lens of the good guy, stopping bombs, conscientiously.  
 
The ticking bomb scenario conceals the civilising mission, an ideology underpinned by racial 
hatred and dehumanisation. When asked, then, what would do in a ticking bomb situation, it 
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